Tajikistan and Uzbekistan: Once economic twins, now economic strangers — How?

Once cohesively forming the silk road that fed global development as enablers of global trade in gold, rubies, and heavenly horses. Now, only Uzbekistan has managed to maintain a fraction of its economic glory with a real GDP of $140B, whilst right beside them, Tajikistan is barely floating and the most globally reliant country on remittances with remittances accounting for 49% of Tajikistan’s GDP in 2024. But how did such a predicament come to be?

The soviet system imposed on Uzbekistan and Tajikistan resulted in their intrinsic interdependence not only between each other but to Russia, preventing any country having economic advantage over Russia to disband and become independent according to many historians including Boris Z Rumer. Uzbekistan produced the USSR’s cotton and natural gas, with the natural gas being provided to Tajikistan in the winters, while Tajikistan was the provider of irrigation systems to Uzbekistan’s cotton industry, which in turn would be sold to Russia. This vertical command hierarchy that the USSR enforced upon the two countries suppressed  their economies with pressured primary sector roles which would cause a high proportion of ‘unskilled’ employment in the economy^[1]. This caused Tajiki and Uzbek contemporaries to get subsistence wages, keeping them stuck on farms or mining plants rather than saving money to open businesses that would add value to Uzbekistan’s labour, propelling both Tajikistan’s and Uzbekistan’s economy. 

Upon the USSR’s dissolution in 1991 came the end of Uzbekistan’s and Tajikistan’s economic binding to the Soviet Union. This was an opportunity for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to grow, however as a new country with no foreign relations and USSR absent in organising both countries’ economies the trajectory towards creating a developed economy was obscured for both countries. Additionally the raw materials that Russia produced for Tajikistan's production in its aluminium industry stopped, causing supply of aluminium to drastically decrease. Russia also abruptly stopped purchasing the mechanical parts for Russian planes from Uzbekistan.^[2] Hence, the abrupt supply deflationary pressures in Tajikistan and the demand deflationary pressures for Russian Aerospace parts in Uzbekistan led to mass unemployment, creating an endangering socioeconomic environment for Uzbekistan’s and Tajikistan’s government. 

However from such an unstable situation Uzbekistan managed to create a self-sufficient economy whilst Tajikistan wasn’t as fortunate. 

Some will blame Uzbekistan’s and Tajikistan’s differences in economic outcome on Uzbekistan’s more liquid inheritance of Gold and using that to then expand its natural gas reserve industry: allowing for Uzbekistan to gain foreign currency. On the other hand Tajikistan mainly had water reserves, which they produced hydroelectricity with, and mining areas utilised for ores and minerals. However, these required systems such as dams or ports with other countries that Tajikistan didn’t have. People that would simply blame misfortunate geography would end it there for Tajikistan. However, the main reason that Tajikistan couldn’t utilise these systems was because the Uzbekistani government blocked every attempt for the Tajikistani economy to thrive. One instance of this is Uzbekistan rejecting Tajikistan’s pleas for the Rogun Dam^[3] to be built which would’ve allowed for Tajikistan to build government revenue through hydroelectric energy. Additionally, the closure to the Tajiki government of mining transit routes that ran through Uzbekistan further depleted Tajikistan’s economy^[11]. The purposeful subversion of Tajikistan’s economy in turn led to President Karimov being able to influence Tajiki policies by using the threat of blocking Uzbekistan’s gas pipes to Tajikistan.^[4] In turn causing erosion in relations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, as a result of Karimov’s subversion of Tajikistan’s economy.

However this subversion of Tajikistan’s economy wasn’t just a case of nationalistic desire for Uzbekistan’s economic superiority, it was a case of preventative action against the Tajik War’s chaos being transmitted to Uzbekistan. Tajikistan towards 1992 posed multiple threats to Karimov’s policy of Gradualism: a doctrine believing that policies should be implemented incrementally to ensure governmental control and hence economic and social stability, as opposed to, implementing policies with the intent of rapid transformation. The Tajik government’s indecisiveness and inability to pay for a national army without USSR subsidisation gave Jadidist-influenced clans like the Gharmis and Pamiris , who felt excluded during the USSR era, the perfect opportunity to form a renewed Islamo-Democratic Tajikistan that would have reduced governmental bias against other Tajik ethnic groups.^[5] However, upon intra-Tajik tensions rising and the Tajik war breaking out in late 1991, the Gharmi group was backed up with military support by the Jihadi terrorists to form the IRP (Islamic Republic Party). Upon this occurring Karimov couldn’t see Tajikistan as a ‘neighbour in need’ but a failed state hosting the perfect breeding ground for “Wahabbis”. With impending probability of these groups spreading Jihadi-influenced islamic ideas through Uzbekistan in an attempt to overthrow secularism, directly affecting Karimov’s policy of social Gradualism^[10]. The seal to Karimov’s prediction however, was when an Uzbek man: Juman Namangani, joined the Gharmi fighters forming the IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan). Which in turn would easily allow for Tajikistan to be used as a launchpad to attack secularist Uzbekistan^[6]. As a consequence, prompting Karimov to shut its borders with Tajikistan for years out of distrust in Tajikistan bringing instability to an economically recovering country. This further harmed Tajikistan over the decades putting them in a position where they had to take loans from China for the building of roads and train stations in order for Tajikistan to be able to monetize their hydroelectricity and mining, putting them in further government debt, impacting long term economic growth.^[7]

Uzbekistan’s rejection and pre-emptiveness to Tajikistan’s economic development wasn’t the only way that both countries economic outcomes differed so much, it was also Karimov’s ability to maintain a stable economy through Isolationism and Gradualism, the puzzle pieces forming Karimov’s ‘Uzbek Puzzle’. Many other post-Soviet nations went through a complete econopolitical reform, causing instability and henceforth a GDP collapse. However, Karimov maintained the economic system that Uzbekistan was used to, cotton farming in order to maintain stability, and hence maintaining consumption and investment within the economy. As a consequence, this maintained Real GDP growth: accelerating from 3-5% annually in 1997-2003 to 7-9% from 2004-2009. Over the decades Karimov allowed for small businesses to operate further increasing GDP levels within the country by causing secondary-sector development, slowly shifting Uzbekistan away from the country engulfed by the primary-sector. Additionally, Karimov utilised gold in order to buy US-dollars to not only fund Uzbek National Security but also to purchase US Dollars to essentially be able to reject western economists’ demands of instant and complete privatization called ‘Shock Therapy’, preventing Uzbekistan from toppling government-debt from GDP collapse^[8]. This essentially provided Uzbekistan with a stable foundation for their economy to build on, allowing for Uzbekistan to be the first post Soviet Republic to surpass its Soviet (1989) Real GDP levels, in 2001. Contrastingly, the Shock Therapy that Tajikistan followed created instability in Tajikistan creating the perfect environment for the Tajik war that put the Government in severe debt^[9]

In conclusion, some may say that the disparities in economic outcome between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan were simply due to Uzbekistan having enough liquid resources to form a completely stable self-sufficient economy, unlike Tajikistan whose hydroelectric sector and mining sector required relations with other governments. Whilst this is true, Tajikistan could’ve easily utilised these sectors through relations with Uzbekistan if they didn’t follow Shock Therapy, turning them into a threat to Karimov. Additionally, the fact that western economists would advise former USSR countries to completely privatise initially goes against basic economic theory of following slow economic growth. This has led to experts raising the question as to whether western economists had a capitalistic vendetta, aimed at fulfilling the western goal of reducing the spread of communism, rather than actually helping former USSR Republics economically. 

1. Pomfret, Richard. “The Economies of Central Asia”. Princeton University Press. 1995. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400864379

2. Spechler, Martin C. “The Economy of Uzbekistan: A Case of Gradualism”. Central Asian Survey, 19, no. 3-4, (2000): 347-360. https://doi.org/10.1080/026349300750058017

3. Carnegie Moscow Center. “The Rogun Dam: A Source of Division in Central Asia”. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2016. https://carnegie.ru/commentary/66334

4. International Crisis Group (ICG). “Central Asia: Water and Conflict”. ICG Asia Report No. 34. May 2002. https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/uzbekistan/central-asia-water-and-conflict

5. Nourzhanov, Kirill, Christian Bleuer. “Tajikistan: A Political and Social History”. Australian National University Press. 2013. http://doi.org/10.22459/TPSH.10.2013

6. International Crisis Group (ICG). “Central Asia: Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security”. ICG Asia Report No. 14. March 2001. https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/uzbekistan/central-asia-islamist-mobilisation-and-regional-security

7. AidData. “China Eximbank provides $15 million loan for Phase 1 of the 400MW Dushanbe CHP-2 Construction Project”. AidData Research Lab. 2025. https://china.aiddata.org/projects/54106

8. Kotz, David M. “The ‘Uzbek Growth Puzzle’ and the Washington Consensus”. University of Massachusetts Amherst. 2004. https://people.umass.edu/dmkotz/Uzbek_Growth_Puzzle_04_01.pdf

9. Popov, Vladimir. “Shock Therapy versus Gradualism Reconsidered: Lessons from Transition Economies after 15 Years of Reforms”. Comparative Economic Studies, 49, (2007): 1-31. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ces.8100182

10. Human Rights Watch. “Creating Enemies of the State: Religious Persecution in Uzbekistan”. Human Rights Watch. 2004. https://www.hrw.org/report/2004/03/29/creating-enemies-state/religious-persecution-uzbekistan

IMF. “Republic of Tajikistan: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix”. International Monetary Fund eLibrary. 2005. https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2005/131/article-A007-en.xml