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Between the UK and US, which country has more effective measures to prevent government overstep by the concentration of power?

  • Josh Mcfadden
  • 6 days ago
  • 6 min read

Introduction


Within democratic countries, legal systems owe a responsibility to prevent the concentration of power by the state. However, in the twenty-first century, the measures to prevent and discourage attempts at centralisation of authority have been increasingly challenged by politicians and other non-government actors. Therefore, this article will aim to analyse the effectiveness of safeguarding measures present in both the United Kingdom and the United States in order to evaluate institutional vulnerabilities in either system. The topics to be discussed include: judicial independence, politicisation, and the resistance that primary legislation may face in both countries.


Judicial independence:


To begin with, Judicial independence in the UK is heavily ensured through the law. Arguably the most significant factor which enforces judicial independence is the security of tenure, established by the Act of Settlement (1701)[1]. The Act of Settlement (1701) states that judges will hold office during “Good behaviour” and may only be removed upon the agreement of both houses of parliament. This is the basis of security of tenure as it created a high legal threshold for judges to be removed. Furthermore, as parliament is technically independent from the government, it is likely that attempts to remove a judge based on their decisions would experience severe pushback from the House of Lords even if the government holds majority. Ultimately, while the House of Commons can eventually overturn the decisions of the House of Lords, the length of time needed for this procedure makes judicial removal effectively difficult. In the context of power concentration, this is significant as it prevents the government from easily removing members of the judiciary whose actions prove troublesome to government goals. Moreover, it aids in blocking coercion which may have forced judges into unofficially supporting government preferences out of fear of repercussions.


Similarly, the US has a system called “life tenure” where federal judges serve until they die, resign, or are impeached. However, the key difference is that this protection is constitutional under Article III, Section I of the constitution[2]. Due to this, the process of discharging federal judges by impeachment is highly controlled by the constitution, limiting its use as a political tool and causing the process to be viable only in cases of serious misconduct. This is evidenced by how impeachments rarely succeed[3]. Consequently, it is difficult for the executive or legislative branch to try and cajole the judiciary into supporting contemporary government values. 


While the UK does rely on parliament for dismissal, no judge in nearly two centuries has been removed under this system as the constitutional convention surrounding it permeates the legislative branch. While it remains theoretically possible that the government could exert political power to influence decisions with the intent of removing a judiciary member, it is highly unlikely due to the unspoken rule. In contrast, Judicial independence within the United States is 

entrenched constitutionally under Article III. Despite this, political rhetoric surrounding impeachment has grown in prominence during recent years, even if practical use remains rare. As a result, the United States offers superior formal protection while in office whereas the United Kingdom offers unique, conventionally entrenched protection for the judiciary. 


Politicisation:


Another area which must be controlled to proficiently prevent government centralisation is how embedded politicisation is within the legal system. This refers to the increased involvement and influence of personal beliefs on decisions thus resulting in slowly biased systems over a period of time. 


The United Kingdom has passed legislation to effectively limit the influence and process of politicisation. An example of this is the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005[4] whereby the responsibilities of the Lord Chancellor were reduced. This is significant because the Lord Chancellor was previously involved in the appointment of judges to the higher courts while simultaneously remaining part of the government. Problems arose from this as it allowed the Lord Chancellor to only select judges compliant with their parties beliefs. Additionally, the Judicial Appointments Commission was formed under the constitutional reform act of 2005. The formation of this organisation had profound effects on the reduction of politicisation as they replaced the Lord Chancellor in selecting candidates for appointment to the high courts[5]. Henceforth, the Lord Chancellor could no longer significantly interfere with the process in pursuit of political agendas, reducing the effect of politicisation on the United Kingdom’s courts. Wherefore, attempts at concentrating power through controlling the appointment of judiciary members became improbable.




In opposition to this, the United States does not use an independent organisation to select appointments to the Supreme Court. Instead, the candidate is selected by the president themselves and then their membership is decided by the senate[6]. Two issues arise from this in reference to risk of politicisation. To begin with, the president is likely to choose a candidate that

closely mirrors their own political ideology. This is because the Supreme Court can block primary legislation by declaring it unconstitutional through judicial review. The significance of

this is found in the fact that a majority political belief on the Supreme Court naturally increases bias in decisions towards the values of that political ideology. Therefore, the president's interests are more greatly supported by the Supreme Court. For example, the president's executive orders are less likely to be blocked. Consequently, efforts to concentrate power can, to an extent, be perpetrated through the selective appointment of federal judges within the US legal system. Despite this, the significance of life tenure must also be considered as it makes any process to embed political beliefs in the Supreme Court extremely time consuming, often longer than a president's term.


As a result, when discussing the risks of politicisation in reference to the concentration of power, the safeguards in the United Kingdom are likely more effective than the United States counterparts. 


Majority influence:


Within each system, the limitations faced by a majority party, either in congress or parliament must be examined in order to further examine the scope of safeguards against legal government overreach.


In the United Kingdom’s Parliament, a government with a majority faces limited opposition. As previously mentioned, one source of opposition is the House of Lords which, while having limited veto power, can slow the passage of primary legislation and force parliament to rethink or justify proposals[7]. Furthermore, the majority party must abide by the rule of law which is an idea of what lawmaking must follow such as equality. The rule of law is enforced by courts and the judiciary who upon request, can investigate the government's actions and return primary legislation to parliament in practice if it is found incompatible through interpretation[8]. Although, the law is not actually struck down and remains valid until parliament chooses to change it. While there are other forms of opposition, these are the most significant. It is important to understand that while these two sources of opposition do limit the power of a majority in the House of Commons, the limitations can either eventually be overturned or are very specific in nature. Due to this, in the United Kingdom, a majority party in the House of Commons has relatively few entrenched constraints against their power allowing them to pass, within reason, any legislation they want to support their agenda. Therefore, the risk of power concentration is increased as for example, with a large enough majority, the aforementioned Constitutional Reform Act (2005) could be overturned allowing politicisation through the Lord Chancellor



In contrast, a majority in congress faces fewer, stronger checks. These include the presidential veto, judicial review, and the separation of powers. Regarding the presidential veto, it, similar to the United Kingdom system, can be overturned by a two thirds majority vote. However, judicial review by the Supreme Court and the separation of powers cannot be overturned. As a result, a majority congress faces severe constraints which cannot be overcome unlike in the United Kingdom.


Because of this, the limitations faced by a majority party in each legislation is likely stronger in the United States making its safeguards stronger in this scenario.


Conclusion:


In conclusion, the issue of power concentration is often combatted by effective safeguards in democratic countries. However, attempts at power concentration come in many forms and from many angles. Throughout this article, it has become apparent that different legal systems will have better safeguards against specific types of power concentration but will be weak to prevent others. Therefore, it is difficult to solely determine whether the United Kingdom or United States has more effective safeguards against power concentration in general. Despite this, we can conclude that the United States performs better against power concentration through majority control but weaker against politicisation attempts. In contrast, the United Kingdom performs better against politicisation attempts but is weaker against majority control.


Bibliography:




  • Constitution Annotated, “Article III”, Accessed December 20, 2025, 







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